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Abstract 
The economic and social prosperity of nations are usually attributed to 
functional requirements—such as honest government, effective transport 
and communication networks, health care and education—and 
development strategies such as investment in infrastructure. However, 
beyond a certain point peak economic and social success relies as much 
on human ingenuity as on capital investment. The article proposes that 
the world’s most prosperous societies have three recurring characteristics 
that foster such ingenuity: (1) they are all closely connected to trading 
portals, (2) they nourish paradoxical belief systems that underscore a 
proclivity for intellectual abstraction and pattern-based interaction, and 
(3) they are stranger societies that encourage high levels of interaction 
between unknown persons. 
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1 This article was first presented as the keynote paper at the Tropics of the Imagination Conference, 
Cairns Institute, James Cook University, September 2015, and a version of the paper will appear in 
the Proceedings of that conference. 
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ow do nations get to be economically and socially 
prosperous? The answer is partly and straightforwardly 
functional. Honest government, sound budgets, intensive transport 
and communication networks, effective primary health and 
education, effective higher education, efficiency in government and 
industry, and a decent market size are all basic building blocks of 
social and economic prosperity. So is the readiness to adopt 
technology and an increase in the amount of services in an 
economy. The experience of the past century, though, is that most 
middle-income countries (those today with an average income per 
capita of around $10,000) will not make it into the top income tier 
of countries. Beyond a certain definable point, the classic 
development strategy of investing in infrastructure stops working. 
You see that today in China. Emerging economies find it difficult to 
convert an infrastructure-driven primary and secondary economy 
into a technology-based consumer and service economy. In the 
latter case, labor-replacing productivity is a key to growth and such 
productivity ultimately relies on creativity and problem-solving 
ingenuity.2 
Portals, Patterns, Paradoxes, and Impersonality 
Peak economic and social success deep down relies as much on 
human ingenuity as it does on capital investment. That then raises 
the question: where does such ingenuity come from? What is its 
source? In this article I propose that there are three essential social  
drivers of ingenuity: (1) portals, (2) paradoxes and patterns, and (3)  
 
 
2 See the comments of Damien Ma, a China analyst at the Paulson Institute, in conversation 
with Zack Beauchamp. Zack Beauchamp, “China’s Real Economic Problem Is Way Bigger than 
the Stock Market,” Vox, July 9, 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/7/9/8922727/china-economy-
stock-market-problem.  
H
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impersonality. Briefly put, the world’s most prosperous societies have 
three recurring characteristics. Firstly, they are all closely connected 
to trading portals. Second, they nourish paradoxical belief systems 
that underscore a proclivity for intellectual abstraction and pattern-
based interaction. Third, these societies are stranger societies. They 
encourage high levels of interaction between unknown persons. Both 
their portal character and their comfort with abstraction underpin this 
third trait.    
Let us then consider how this model works in the world’s poorest 
geographic zone. The tropics today are the most hard-up of the 
world’s major geographic regions.3 Climate—i.e., heat and humidity—
once played a decisive role in tropical economies. Since the spread of 
air-conditioning, working in the tropics and the subtropics has 
become much more pleasant. So climate now is only a peripheral 
factor in economic performance. Geography nonetheless remains a 
central element in economic and social success. Overall today, the 
world is a lot less poor than it was three decades ago. In 1981, 52 
percent of the population in developing countries lived in extreme 
poverty; by 2010 that figure had fallen to 21 percent. In the tropics, 
the number of extreme poor over the same period dropped from 51 
percent of total population to 28 percent. In the rest of the world, 
extreme poverty fell from 53 percent to 14 percent of the population.4 
The whole globe has improved markedly, the tropical zone though 
least so.  
The most improved parts of the tropics have been Southeast Asia 
and Central America, while extreme poverty in Central and  
Southern Africa has gotten worse. A key reason for the latter’s 
 
3 “. . . more than two-thirds of the world’s poorest people live in the tropics,” State of the 
Tropics 2014 report, James Cook University, Cairns, Australia, p. xiii and chapter 6.  
4 State of the Tropics 2014 report, James Cook University, Cairns, Australia, 2014. 
110                                            PETER MURPHY 
 
 
 
worsening condition is the geography of Africa—or rather its coast.5 
Simply put: coastal Africa has few natural harbors or ports and hence 
a poor history of portal trade.6 In contrast three out of nineteen of the 
most commonly top-ranked economically and socially prosperous 
nations today (see Tables 1 and 2) are in the tropics: Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. In fifty years these countries went from 
poverty to wealth. They achieved this major advance because they 
emerged as nodes in a major maritime zone (see Table 3); Singapore 
today is the number two container port in the world; Hong Kong is 
number four. Taiwanese ports are ranked fourteenth (Kaohsiung); 
fifty-three (Keelung and Taipei) and ninety-three (Taichung) 
respectively.7 
The idea of “the port” does not only signify a functional economic 
node. It is also a metaphor for ceaseless “in-and-out” transactions.  A 
transactional society is only possible where process and paperwork, 
the life-blood of bureaucracy, are kept to a minimum. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan are at times called ‘Confucian’ societies, 
meaning that they are structured around family, bureaucratic 
authority, and patronage. Yet in the case of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, the more decisive if less obvious developmental 
influence has been the diffuse heterodox minority religion of Taoism. 
In Taiwan, a third of the population identifies as Taoist; 11 percent of 
Singaporeans do as well; and 14 percent of Hong Kong citizens. 
Taoism is part popular religion and part popular philosophy. Most 
significant of all, it is a belief system filled with paradoxes.  
 
 
5 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London: Abacus, 1999); Thomas Sowell, 
Wealth, Poverty and Politics: An International Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 
6 Cf. the “very limited number of good natural harbours along both coasts of Africa.” Peter 
Duignan and L. H. Gann, Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975),296. 
7 These rankings are measured by the total number of twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) 
handled by the ports.  
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Table 2. Multiple-Listed High-Performing Nations 
Table 3. Portal Zones 
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Taoism is well known for encouraging its adherents to think in 
opposites: solid-and-void, black-and-white, presence-and-absence, 
abundance-and-scarcity, above-and-below, agreement-and-disagreement, 
entrance-and-exit, internal-and-external, frequent-and-rare, hard-
and-soft, and so on. This mental approach has myriad implications. 
Thinking-in-opposites—fusing them, combining them—is the 
essence of creative thinking. Merging antitheses is what the 
imagination does. Forms, patterns, and shapes are created by the 
coalescence of opposites. 8  The act of creation—in art, business,  
science, technology, in life in general—occurs when we look at 
something going up and can see it in our mind’s eye going down 
simultaneously, like an E.M. Escher lithograph. The person who  
says “let us meld Amazon’s retail model and the sale of enterprise 
software” or “let us put themes into amusement parks” or “let us 
blend academic citations and web searches”— takes two things not 
normally connected and associates them in an act of creation.9 The 
more radical the association, the more it has the feel of being 
uncanny; the more it resembles the quantum paradox that a wave is 
a particle and vice-versa.  
We see this uncanny both-and mentality echoed in the 
ambidextrous attitudes of the Taiwanese today who are both armed  
 
 
8  Where do form and pattern come from? The primary source of them is paradox. A 
paradoxical mind is a creative mind. Creative societies are forged from the well-spring of paradox. 
Paradox is crucial because it unites opposites into a singularity. An economy is a blend of income 
and expenditure. Each is an expression of the other. So it is with creation in general. Patterns arise 
when yin and yang coalesce into one form. Sensation and concept, body and mind, matter and spirit, 
relaxation and tension: what forges these into a creation is not their counter-position but rather 
their fusion into a single entity. This has application in all aspects of life not just in the arts. The 
arts are a litmus test for something more general, a sign of the depth and breadth of creativity in 
any society. 
9 The allusions are to Sales force [the customer relationship management company], Disney 
Corporation, and Google. Jeff Dyer, Hal Gregersen, and Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's 
DNA: Mastering the Five Skills of Disruptive Innovators (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 
2011), 17–40. 
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against mainland China and yet do vast business in that country. The 
case of Hong Kong is similar. It is a part of China and yet it is a 
Special Administrative Region (SAR) with its own ways of doing 
things. Mainland China is a bureaucratic state. In sharp contrast the 
background Taoist ambience of Hong Kong shies away from the 
deliberate action of the state. The Taoist attitude is: “Let it be”: 
leave it alone. Adapt to the cycles of the world rather than try and 
rule or direct them.10 Background Taoism looks to the tacit “pattern 
of things” rather than to methodical state, institutional or  
bureaucratic intervention and organization. Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan are not libertarian societies by any means. They have 
plenty of laws and regulations. Yet, by orthodox Confucian 
standards, they are relatively free. They have a greater tolerance for 
the spontaneous order of markets, industries, cities and publics than 
their neighbors. They are more ready to pay attention to patterns 
rather than persons, impersonal abstractions in place of patrimonial 
connections.11 
The case of maritime East Asia can be fruitfully compared with 
that of Central America and the instructive example of Panama. The  
 
 
10 The ethos of “let it be” directly parallels the view of one of the principal architects of Hong 
Kong’s powerful economy, Sir John James Cowperthwaite (1915–2006), who was the then-
colony’s Financial Secretary between 1961 and 1971, and who advocated “positive non-
intervention.” In 1962 Cowperthwaite insisted that “[over] a wide field of our economy it is still 
the better course to rely on the nineteenth century’s ‘hidden hand’ than to thrust clumsy 
bureaucratic fingers into its sensitive mechanism.”  (Lawrence W. Reed, “The Man Behind the 
Hong Kong Miracle,” The Freeman, February 10, 2014). Positive non-intervention meant that 
“[personal] taxes were kept at a maximum of 15 percent; government borrowing was wholly 
unacceptable; there were no tariffs or subsidies. Red tape was so reduced that a new company 
could be registered with a one-page form. Cowperthwaite believed that government should 
concern itself with only minimal intervention on behalf of the most needy, and should not 
interfere in business. Reflecting on what became the world’s most successful economy, 
Cowperthwaite remarked ‘I did very little. All I did was to try to prevent some of the things that 
might undo it’.” (Obituary, “Sir John Cowperthwaite,” Telegraph, January 25, 2006).  
11  On Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore as low-trust familial societies, see Francis 
Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1996), 10, 29, 
30, 50, 56, 57, 84–95.  
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latter is mid-ranked economically and socially in the world. It has 
some good prospects of climbing the global ladder. Yet it also 
illustrates the difficulties that nations have in achieving this ascent. In 
the 2000s and 2010s, Panama was one of the fastest growing 
countries in the Americas. Its GDP growth rose from 2.2 percent in 
2002 to 8.6 percent in 2006 to 10.7 percent in 2012. The two pivotal 
factors of (1) portal and (2) paradox and pattern played a part in this.  
The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 
Colón port is ranked the fortieth busiest container port in the world, 
Balboa, forty-fifth; Melbourne is fifty-eighth; and Oakland sixty-
second in contrast. Panama has a portal economy. A vast “in-and-
out” traffic goes through the Canal. Panama’s economy reflects this 
gateway condition. Its service sector, including financial, insurance, 
flagship registration and legal industries, makes up 80 percent of the 
country’s GDP. The expansion of the Canal fueled Panama’s GDP 
growth in the 2010s. In terms of a conventional (that is to say, a  
functional) model of an economy, Panama has distinct strengths and  
weaknesses. Its transport infrastructure is a factor of strength as are its 
efficient business regulations. Starting a business takes six days and 
five steps. Panama has an open economy with low tariffs and a lean 
fiscal regime. In 2013, public expenditure was an economical 26 
percent of GDP and public debt a relatively modest 41 percent of 
GDP. Fiscal consolidation had reduced public debt from 66.2 percent 
of GDP in 2005. Finance and capital markets are run  
soundly with high capital and liquidity ratios.12  However, property  
rights in Panama are insecure and the rule of law is weak. Both of 
these deficits reflect a patrimonial economic and social mentality. 
 
12  Corinne Deléchat and Svetlana Vtyurina, “Panama: Growth to Remain Buoyant,” IMF 
Survey Magazine, March 28, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/ 
car032713a.htm. 
116                                            PETER MURPHY 
 
 
 
Panama’s judiciary is personalized, politicized, corrupt, and inefficient. 
Much of the land in the country is lacking in legal title.  
These conditions point to a persistent difficulty countries have in 
achieving full modernity. Peak modern societies are “automated 
societies.” They are dominated by four self-organizing systems: 
industries, markets, cities, and publics. In peak highly automated 
societies, patrimonial connection is edged aside by impersonal order. 
This impersonal order begins with “the rule of law.” Laws replace 
personal direction and connection. But eventually laws in their turn 
are displaced by impersonal patterns. Cycles and ratios emerge as 
more important than procedures, policies, and rules. It is not that the 
latter disappear—any more than personal interaction disappears in an 
automated or self-organizing society. It is not a matter of either-or. 
Rather it is a matter of relative weighting. In the most advanced 
societies, that is, in the peak automated societies, patterns, 
abstractions, and quasi-aesthetic qualities like ratios and proportions  
acquire increasing and outsized significance in the overall way that a 
society functions. 
Can we measure this development? To an extent we can via 
proxies such as the percentage of employment in a society devoted to 
copyright industries. This is not to say that copyright industries are 
where “the wealth of the future” lies. More simply the relative size of 
these industries is a proxy to measure the value that societies generate 
through paradox or pattern in contrast to patrimony or procedure. 
This is a proxy for the extent to which a given society is able to turn 
enigma into economics and aesthetics into assets. Copyright industries 
produce economic value through the broadcasting, distribution, and 
sale of legally protected works. There are a variety of types of 
copyright industries: core copyright industries, ancillary hardware 
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industries, artefact and experience industries, and support industries.13 
Leading economies have (relatively speaking) sizable copyright 
industry sectors. Eight percent of employment in Australia is in that 
sector; Netherlands, 8.8 percent; the United States, 8.5 percent. In 
Panama the figure is 3.3 percent.14 It grew by 0.25 percent between 
2002 and 2006.15  The contribution of copyright industries to 
Panama’s GDP is 6 percent compared with 11 percent in the United 
States and 10.3 percent in Australia.16  In Singapore the sector 
contribution is 5.6 percent. That latter figure points perhaps to a long-
term weakness in the Singaporean economy and in the powerful 
Chinese portal economies more generally, notwithstanding their great 
achievements.  
 
 
13 The economic contribution of each of these industries has to be weighted according to the 
degree of their contribution to copyright value (Jorge Castillo Martinez, Tables 5A and 5B: 
Adjustment Factors to the Contributions of the Copyright-based industries in Panama: 2006, in 
The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries in Panama, 242). Core industries include press 
and literature; films and video; music, theater production, operas; radio and television; 
photography; graphic and visual arts; software and databases; advertising services. Hardware 
industries include physical media, equipment, device and instrument producers. The artefact 
industries include garments, textiles, shoes; jewelry; furniture, porcelain; glassware, and household 
goods design; carpets, rugs, toys and games design; architecture and engineering; and interior 
design and museum design. Experience industries produce copyright value when for example 
copyrights are collected for music in nightclubs, discotheques, bars and restaurants, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/performance/pdf/econ_contribution_cr_
pa.pdf 
14  Martinez, Figure 14: Percentage Comparison of the Copyright-based Industries 
Contribution to Employment Worldwide, in The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries in 
Panama, 287. http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/performance/pdf/econ_ 
contribution_cr_pa.pdf. The study’s methodology is based on that of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). 
15 Martinez, Table 1: Participation of the Copyright-based Industries in the Total Employment, 
according to Industry Category in the Republic of Panama, in The Economic Contribution of Copyright-
Based Industries in Panama, 229. In the core copyright industries, between 2002 and 2006, music, 
film, video, television, software and databases, advertising grew; visual and graphic arts and 
photography declined. Press and publishing, and music and theater, were the major subcategories 
of employment.  
16  Martinez, Figure 13: Percentage Comparison of the Copyright-based Industries 
Contribution to Value Added Worldwide, in The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries in 
Panama, 286. 
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The emerging auto-industrial age is exacerbating such weaknesses. 
In many global economies automation is increasingly replacing office 
work and sales work by machines (computers and robots).17 The age 
of the white collar “knowledge economy” is winding down. This also 
means that today “creative work” (in the broadest sense of that term; 
work of a non-routine, problem-solving kind) is becoming 
increasingly important as a means of replacing work that is being 
replaced by machines. The post-industrial path from agricultural and 
manufacturing work to routine service and office work is being 
computerized out of existence. The paradox-and-pattern path to 
prosperity is thus becoming ever more important. 
This then raises the question: are some societies more creative 
than others? The answer is “yes” to the extent that some societies 
rest more easily on “paradox, pattern and impersonality” than others 
do. But if that is so, why is it so? Is there some kind of social 
“paradox factory”? If there is such a thing, then its source is 
probably religion—or at least a subset of religions. I have already 
pointed to the role of Taoism as an agent of paradox in maritime 
East Asia. What about in the Central American isthmus? Panama is 
a predominately Catholic country. An estimated 75–85 percent of 
the population identifies as Catholic; 15–25 percent is evangelical  
Protestants.18 (The government does not collect exact figures.) A  
 
 
 
17 Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, Technology at Work: The Future of Innovation and 
Employment, Oxford Martin School, Feb. 2015; Carl Benedikt Frey and Martin Osborne, The Future 
of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? Oxford Martin School, Oxford University, 
September 17, 2013; David H. Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard L. Murnane, “The Skill Content of 
Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 4 
(2003): 1279–333; David H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, “The Polarization 
of the U.S. Labor Market,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96, no. 2 (2006): 189–94; 
David Autor and David Dorn, “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the 
U.S. Labor Market,” American Economic Review 103, no. 5, (2013): 1553–97. 
18 US Department of State, “Panama: International Religious Freedom Report 2007,” United 
States Department of State Diplomacy in Action, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2007/90262.htm. 
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small but visible religious group is the 20,000- to 40,000-strong body 
of Mormons. 19  The Mormons make up 1 percent of Panama’s 
population compared with their 2 percent counterpart among the 
American population. Small perhaps—but size is not the only 
measure of influence. Jewish Americans, who make up 2 percent of 
the US population, constitute 7 percent of US corporate board 
members. The presence of Mormons in American business is 
similarly outsized.20 
By the measure of mainstream Christianity, the doctrinal views of 
Mormons are clearly heterodox. However what is important for the 
present discussion is neither doctrine nor creed but rather the way in 
which certain belief systems generate paradoxes. The American 
literary and religious scholar Terry Givens calls the Mormons a 
“people of paradox.” 21  He argues that the Mormon mind is  
structured by a series of paradoxes: those of “authority and radical 
freedom,” “searching and certainty,” “the sacral and the banal” and 
“election and exile.” The thing about paradoxes is that they are not 
dualisms but rather dualities that are compressed successfully into 
singularities. Thus, in the Mormon case, the divine is found in 
everyday life, moral freedom is achieved through thoughtful 
obedience, certainty makes searching possible, and religious election 
leads to exile in the larger culture. While this matrix might reflect the 
specificities of the Mormon mind it also has some generalizable  
implications. The Mormon divinization of the material, a classic 
paradox, for example parallels the Protestant spiritualization of 
work. Both are types of paradox that energize a material civilization.  
 
 
19 The Mormons belong to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
20 Jackson Lears, “The Mormon Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” The New Republic, October 
19, 2012. 
21 Terry L. Givens, People of Paradox: A History of Mormon Culture (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
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They invest inert matter with a dynamic sense of spirit. They 
animate the inanimate. The compression of duality into singularity is 
the way that creation in general works. So perhaps it is then not so 
surprising that the New York Times would report in 2014 that the 
most successful Americans today are from Iranian, Lebanese, 
Indian, Chinese, and Mormon backgrounds.22 The Mormons have 
been especially successful in corporate America because they 
fruitfully interpolate the paradox of freedom and authority—a 
paradox tailored to innovation in plodding institutional 
environments. Notably, many high-achieving Mormons come from 
modest backgrounds. This fact is both a metaphor for countries 
climbing the economic and social ladder and a pointer to the kinds 
of social groups that engineer such upward mobility.  
This kind of mobility does not arise from conventional economic 
formulae. That is not to say that conventional fiscal, market,  
education, and health prescriptions and functions are not important. 
They are. But behind such formulae lie more subtle considerations. 
In 1945 the Republic of Korea was in a state of absolute poverty. 
Today it ranks thirty-fourth in per capita GDP (PPP) at $33,000 per 
head. This compares with Australia which is ranked seventh at 
$43,000 per head. Syngman Rhee, the strong-man first president of 
the Korean Republic, was a Protestant convert and many members 
of his inaugural cabinet were Christians. This at the time when in the 
country, only two percent of the population was Christian (by 2005,  
30 percent of South Koreans were Christians). South Korea adopted 
a flag whose centerpiece was the Taoist yin-yang symbol. At one 
point in his life Rhee had also been a Taoist convert. The latter is  
 
 
 
22 Amy Chua and Jed Rubenfeld, “What Drives Success?,” New York Times, January 25, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/opinion/sunday/what-drives-success.html?_r=0. 
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significant not just to underscore the role that heterodox religion 
plays in the promethean labors of social creation but also to point to 
a weakness of the yin-yang theory.  
For generally implied by the yin-yang theory is the notion that 
opposites are properly kept in balance. They are best to remain 
clear-and-distinct and in equilibrium with each other.23 That is not 
without practical or conceptual value. But creation requires more 
than this, namely, the paradoxical fusion of opposites. No one 
understood this better than the English Catholic convert Gilbert K. 
Chesterton, whose own writings are permeated with paradox, and 
who thought of Christianity as a religion of paradox. What is being 
suggested here is that if paradox is a crucible of social creation then 
the social and economic effects of Christian minorities are crucial. 
This is not a question of the role of doctrinal belief but rather the 
effects of an ethos laced with paradoxical assumptions.    
In Panama, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Christian 
heterodoxy contributes something key to the latent background of 
social creation. Singapore has 11 percent Protestants, 7 percent 
Catholics (and 10 percent Taoists); Taiwan 4 percent Christians (and 
30 percent Taoists); Hong Kong 7 percent Protestants, 5 percent 
Catholics (and 14 percent Taoists). Panama has 19 percent 
Protestants in a country where 72 percent of the population 
identifies as Catholics. The argument is not that many people say 
they are “Christians” and that therefore “creative activity” follows  
from being Christian. That is an implausible proposition when 
religious identification in a modern society is often nominal. Rather  
 
 
 
23 “The yin and yang principles act on one another, affect one another and keep one another in 
place” (Chuang Tzu). 
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it is arguable that religion is most relevant where small, not large,  
heterodox religious groups play an outsized role in the generation of 
economic and social dynamism. Accordingly, the spread of 
Protestantism in contemporary mainland China is not just an effect 
but also one of the causes of the economic rise of China’s coastal 
provinces.24 
The Stranger Society  
Heterodoxy often appears in unusual forms. Take the case of the 
Sephardic Spanish and Portuguese Jews who were forcibly 
converted by the Inquisition to Christianity and migrated to 
Panama.25 Does the migration of the conversos (”converted”) and the  
anusim (“forced”) in the sixteenth through the eighteenth century 
still subtly influence what happens today in the Central American 
isthmus? Did these families inhabit two worlds simultaneously—
living crypto-Jewish private lives and Catholic public lives? Does the 
simultaneous inhabitation of two worlds make a person more adept 
at the kinds of paradoxical fusions that creation requires? Do the 
two become one, duality turning eventually into singularity? Can 
such a mind-set be relevant across hundreds of years? Does it leave  
subtle traces across time? Given that Panama in the twentieth 
century had a tiny Jewish population but two Jewish heads of state, 
 
24 Historically, the merchant in China was socially-defined as a stranger and an outsider. Gary 
G. Hamilton, Commerce and Capitalism in Chinese Societies (New York: Routledge, 2006), 59; Daniel 
Chirot and Anthony Reid, eds., Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of 
Southeast Asia and Central Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 
25 “The Virtual Jewish World: Panama,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ 
jsource/vjw/Panama.html; Be’chollason. “Spanish and Portuguese Speaking Jews,” 
http://www.bechollashon.org/ projects/spanish/spanish.php#anusim; Family Search, “Panama 
Jewish Records,” https://familysearch.org/learn/wiki/en/Panama_Jewish_Records; Yvonne 
Garcia, “A Brief History of Crypto Jews of Spanish and Portuguese Descent,” The Association of 
Crypto-Jews, http://www.cryptojew.org/the_history_of_the_beni_anusim.html. 
Budhi 19.2 & 19.3 (2015): 107–134.                                                                 123  
 
 
 
the only state apart from Israel to have done so, one wonders about 
such latent long-term effects.26 
So then can we expect Panama to eventually become the Hong 
Kong of Central America? Maybe—but also maybe not; social 
forecasting is uncertain. In part, this uncertainty is because any 
society at a given instant in time is a curate’s egg. Some things point 
one way; others point another way. One looks at a mid-tier country 
like Panama and observes forward momentum and backward drag. 
A society without secure property rights will not advance to the top 
tier of countries. The absence of clear and firm property rights in 
turn hints at a larger existential problem. High-achieving modern 
countries tend to be stranger societies. That is, a significant portion 
of their social interactions take place between strangers. In these 
societies, the world of personal connection has been displaced and 
complemented to a visible degree by impersonal interactions, or 
more precisely relations between strangers.27 
This shift applies to even the most private interactions. Forty 
percent of American singles today use online dating sites.28 In less 
intimate spheres in stranger societies, patrimonial governmentality, 
patron-client relations, kinship networks and communitarian 
behaviors are overwritten to a significant degree by the need to deal 
with people about whom we have little or no knowledge. The  
interactions can be direct or indirect, face-to-face or virtual, but they  
are not mediated by social direction, etiquette, brokering or status 
but rather by the impersonal patterns of markets, industries, cities,  
 
 
26 Max Delvalle (1911–1979), President of Panama in 1967; Eric Arturo Delvalle (born 1937), 
President of Panama from 1985 to 1988.  
27 The anthropological and historical background to this is outlined by Paul Seabright, The 
Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
28 Erika Ettin, “Online Dating in U.S. Continues Climbing,” Tribune News Service, August 16, 
2015. 
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and publics. These are actions that are induced by what the 
sociologist Georg Simmel called the “objectivity of the stranger.” 
Advanced economies and societies rely heavily on these types of 
interactions. Less developed countries, arguably, less so.  
Thus even societies that rank high on global indexes of economic 
freedom, with honest government and secure property rights—and 
that even fulfill some of the principles of nineteenth-century liberal 
small government—still might not ascend the ladder of prosperity. 
For example, Estonia ranks number eight on the Wall Street Journal’s 
index of economic freedom and yet is forty-third in GDP per capita. 
Perhaps its GDP rank is simply a matter of time-lag; if so, Estonia 
will catch up after having been once a captive nation of the old 
Soviet Union.29 That scenario is plausible. However, in the state of 
post-Communism, Estonia exhibits only moderate levels of social 
trust. Thirty-six percent and 34 percent of Estonians when surveyed 
respectively say that they have “recently helped a stranger” and that  
they “generally trust people.”30 Those percentages are better figures 
than in the case of Japan or Singapore but they are also still 
significantly lower than most high-performing societies.   
The point is that impersonal interaction with strangers is a major 
dimension of vibrant markets, industries, cities, and publics. 
Substitutes for it can be found but finding these substitutes is often 
difficult to do. Japan’s discomfort with the Gaijin, the outsider or the  
unfamiliar person, is well known; at the same time Japan’s national  
identification with Western technology and culture, also well known, 
balances this. Singapore may be officially a multicultural state, but its  
 
 
29 Chile is similar. It ranks 7th on the WSJ index of free economies but 53rd in GDP per capita. 
Among the Chileans, 51 percent say they have helped a stranger in the past month, around the 
global average, but only 15 percent of them say that most people can be trusted.  
30 Legatum Institute, Legatum Prosperity Index 2014, November 3, 2014, figures for Estonia.  
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social media still has to provide tips on “How to Talk to Random 
Strangers in Singapore and Make New Friends.” 31  This kind of 
advice is not one that, for instance, many Australians need. The 
philosopher Roger Scruton has noted how the success of modern 
English society was closely correlated with its ability to create 
institutions where strangers readily mingled with each other without 
crowding each other.32 
These kinds of institutions rest on “the freedom of weak ties.” 
The Internet is an excellent example of a technology that mediates 
stranger interaction by facilitating this kind of freedom. In a more 
general sense, self-organizing entities of all kinds rely on large 
numbers of people connecting freely through weak ties—seller and 
buyer, technology expert and forum browser, sports player and 
sideline watcher, music performer and music fan. These types of 
interactions are the opposite of those where strong ties prevail. Most  
human beings have a handful of strong ties.33 Strong ties imply “high-
touch” relationships literally and metaphorically. A part of human 
happiness rests on such relationships. Conversely a part of human 
happiness rests on weak ties, especially in the modern age. Societies 
that are modelled on strong ties today mostly underperform  
economically and socially. 34  High-performing markets, industries,  
 
 
 
31 Nicholas Chen, “How to Talk to Random Strangers in Singapore and Make New Friends,” 
The Smart Local, February 20, 2015, http://www.thesmartlocal.com/read/strangers-singapore 
32 Roger Scruton, England: An Elegy (London: Continuum, 2006).  
33  The British anthropologist, Robin Dunbar, in the 1990s estimated that the number of 
people human beings could know in a personal sense was about 150, the size of the Neolithic 
village. But in a modern society we physically interact with at least 80,000 people in a lifetime (78.3 
average lifespan minus 5 years of being a small child x 3 persons x 365 days a year = 80,263 
people).  
34 One of the reasons for this is the dynamics of innovation. Referring to studies on the 
diffusion of innovation, Mark Granovetter made the point in his classic 1973 paper on the 
paradox of the strength of weak ties that persons with weak ties were “best placed to diffuse . . . a 
difficult innovation.” M. S. Granovetter,” The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 
78, no. 6 (1973): 1367.  
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cities, and publics are in large measure automated. That is to say, 
they are self-organizing. A self-organizing tie is one (simply put) that 
is not bureaucratic. It does not rest on rules, directions, policies, or 
committees.35 
Weak ties have strong economic and social outcomes. Once we 
step outside the sphere of family and friends, the efficacy of modern 
life in many ways relies on those self-organizing orders (viz., 
markets, industries, cities, and publics) where weak ties flourish. 
These entities are characterized by large numbers of ephemeral 
connections—that is, quickly passing relations between individuals. 
These ties bring persons together briefly. Such ties work when the 
connection is not elaborate and the transaction between persons is  
done swiftly, without fuss, and in minimum time. These relations are 
economic, efficient, and rapid. They are thin rather than thick, yet in 
their own way they are satisfying. They are timesaving and cost 
effective, yet they generate high levels of gratification because of 
their implicit aesthetic qualities. Generally speaking we do not 
organize our personal lives in this way, although perhaps even that is 
changing. But certainly in broader social life, when we install 
technology, buy things, use transport, or read the news, the  
preference in peak societies is that things are done smartly, without 
being convoluted or highly wrought. Avoiding multiple steps, delays, 
obtuse complexity, and baroque complication is typically favored. 
For this reason, simple abstract patterns become the basis of social 
interaction rather than multiple rules or elaborate etiquette.  
 
35  The introduction of strong processes in place of strong ties was the one of the great 
experiments of the twentieth century. This was “the organization age.” Organization, 
documentation, and application replaced personal connections in major economies. Committees 
and formal criteria substituted for clubs and fraternities. Generally, though, strong process worked 
no better than strong ties in economic and social life. The high-touch bureaucratic simulations of 
thick ties that proliferated in the voluminous modern care-and-concern industries proved on the 
whole to be neither efficient nor affectionate.   
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That is to say, markets, industries, cities, and publics organize 
themselves not via explicitly formulated rules, regulations or 
expectations but rather via tacit aesthetically recognizable ratios, 
cycles, meshes, fractals, proportions, and the like. Take a group of 
students who have never met before and a stock of chairs massed 
against a wall. Ask the students to pick up a chair and sit themselves 
down. They will do so in a spontaneous pattern; for example 
following the configuration of the golden ratio. That is the way that 
strangers who know little or nothing about each other 
spontaneously interact.  
The interaction of strangers increasingly matters in economic and 
social affairs. Take the case today of the heavily bureaucratized and 
overpriced education and health sectors in major economies. These 
sectors are very costly. For this reason, medical and education-
driven visitation-and-retirement is a foreseeable major future 
industry in mid-tier countries. Panama is a good example. It has low 
costs (half of the US cost of living), a decent infrastructure, and a 
qualified work force. The expatriation retirement industry magazine 
International Living’s Global Retirement Index 2015 ranked Ecuador, 
Panama, Mexico, Malaysia, and Costa Rica as the best places to 
retire that year.36 Eleven out of the top twenty retirement countries 
were tropical zone nations. The number two country, Panama, has a  
growing expatriate retirement population and a visa system that 
services this cohort. In 2012 the Wharton Business School noted 
that 350,000 American retirees were receiving retirement benefits 
outside the US and that the travel industry was estimating that 
upwards of 3.3 million US baby boomer retirees were planning  
 
 
 
36 International Living, http://internationalliving.com/2015/01/the-best-places-to-retire-2015/ 
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expatriated retirement due to the high cost of living in the United 
States especially medical costs but also housing costs.37 Long-living 
older populations with substantial assets are common now in high-
cost advanced economies.  
A large-scale expatriation industry, though, assumes a high 
tolerance for interactions with strangers. Responding to global poll 
questions in 2013 and 2010, 45 percent of Panamanians answered 
“yes” to the question “have you helped a stranger in the past 12 
months?” compared to a world average of 48 percent and 55 
percent in Hong Kong; while 21 percent of Panamanians thought 
that “most people can be trusted” compared to 24 percent 
internationally and 30 percent in Hong Kong.38 In the United States 
79 percent of people reported helping a stranger and 37 percent of 
people said that “most people can be trusted.” (Note the spread of 
figures in the US case.) In Australia, the figures were 65 percent and  
46 percent respectively; Switzerland, 54 percent and 45 percent; 
Denmark, 55 percent and 62 percent.  
The correlation between social and economic ranking and the 
stranger society is high (see Table 4). In recent survey data, 26 
percent and 33 percent of Japanese respectively said that they  
recently had helped a stranger and that they generally trusted people; 
24 percent and 32 percent of Singaporeans said the same. The 
measure of confidence in strangers roughly mirrors the social and 
economic ladder: “high trust” exists in Australia and Hong Kong; 
“medium trust” in Japan and Taiwan; and “low trust” in South  
 
 
 
37 ”What’s Driving Americans to Retire Abroad? Money—or Lack of It,” Knowledge @ Wharton, 
July 18, 2012, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whats-driving-americans-to-retire-
abroad-money-or-lack-of-it/. 
38 Legatum Institute, “The 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index,” drawing on Gallup World Poll 
data. http://www.li.com/activities/publications/2014-legatum-prosperity-index. 
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Korea and Thailand. This rank-order broadly parallels GDP per 
capita (PPP).39 Exceptions like Singapore rely on an unusually high 
level of impersonal procedure instead of impersonal relationships. 
This pattern suggests that (however it is defined) development is not 
just an expression of functional factors, important as these are, but 
is mediated in, through and by the capacity of human beings to 
interact with strangers. 
 
Table 4. Proportion of Respondents Indicating Higher Trust  
in Various Groups or Individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Paul R. Ward, Loreen Mamerow and Samantha B. Meyer, “Interpersonal Trust across Six 
Asia-Pacific Countries: Testing and Extending the ‘High Trust Society’ and ‘Low Trust Society’ 
Theory,” PLoS One 9, no. 4 (2014): 1–17. 
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Conclusion 
The essence of the matter is that interaction with strangers is the 
sinew of markets, industries, cities, and publics. Accordingly broad 
economic and social performance is conditioned by the weak ties of 
stranger societies because these ties facilitate and animate human 
creation. Because they are brief, weak social connections easily 
multiply. Such multiplicity diversifies sources of information. Such 
diversification encourages creativity due to the fact that the creative  
process entails the bringing together of a wide range of ideas that are 
not normally associated. It requires the fusion of what normally 
stands apart. Quick connections (due to weak ties) expose 
individuals to things that are distant or removed in nature. In some 
cases at least, this functions as a crucible of creativity. Creation 
melds the distant with what is more familiar and closer-to-hand. 
In a parallel vein effective dealing with strangers requires a kind 
of two-world cognition—an intellectual and intellectual-emotional 
facility for stitching together the worlds of ego and alter, mine and 
thine. This process requires melding what is known (mine) with 
what unknown (thine). This melding can range from a very loose 
stitching to an intense fusion of worlds. The latter in particular is 
closely connected with creation, which is an act of synthesis. It 
combines things that are otherwise set apart. There are many kinds 
of creative synthesis. These can range from the synthesis of 
existential worlds, and the arts and sciences to products, processes, 
and personalities. The act of synthesis is underwritten by acts of 
pattern thinking.  
Creation is a mode of human action. Its importance varies from 
society to society. In a very general sense creation is one of three key 
modes of social action. The other modes are patrimonial action and 
procedural action. Patrimonial behaviors are modelled after family  
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relations, the most familiar of all modes of human interaction. The 
familial is the key model for familiar action. In the familiar social 
world, one person knows another person—or else does business by 
“getting to know” another person. This world consists of clients, 
patrons, personal service, and high-touch behavior. Procedural 
action in contrast does not rely on personal knowledge. Rather 
persons interact through rules and procedures, that is, they engage  
with each other via formal rules and regulations usually involving  
large amounts of paperwork. Familiar (including patrimonial) modes 
of interaction rely on one-world cognition. Procedural action 
assumes multiple worlds but a single defined formal rule-governed 
process. Creative action is different again. It places low reliance on 
rules. It does not assume familiarity. Rather it operates through 
aesthetic media—simple tacit patterns such as ratios, equilibria, 
unions of opposites, meshes, and so on. 
That typology in its turn is a pointer to economic and social 
development. All societies have elements of familiar, procedural, 
and creative action. These types are fundamental modes of social 
action. Societies distinguish themselves according to the relative 
weight that they allot to personal, procedural, and pattern behavior. 
Some place priority on close relations, some on formal relations, and 
some on strangers acting through patterns. The latter are especially 
conducive to markets, publics, industries, and cities. These 
(essentially self-organizing) kinds of social order are closely 
connected with the generation of modern economic and social 
prosperity. This correlation suggests that societies that wish to climb 
the ladder of economic and social development face tacitcultural 
pressure to convert personal to distant and formal to archetypical 
relations.  
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